From the Black Sox to the NBA’s lottery, the same temptation keeps resurfacing

Tanking is no longer just a basketball argument about whether teams are “playing the process.” In a recent Yahoo Sports column, the writer framed it as a “paradox” that feels oddly familiar to gamblers, then pointed to the 1919 Chicago White Sox and their alleged World Series fix. While the NBA has no reported, bribery-style scandal tied to draft position this week, the column landed as the league leans harder into policy aimed at discouraging teams from optimizing for the lottery rather than competition.

The historical comparison is not subtle. The Black Sox scandal centered on allegations that eight members of the 1919 White Sox were bribed to lose the World Series to the Cincinnati Reds. Britannica notes that the players implicated were pitchers Eddie Cicotte and Claude (Lefty) Williams, first baseman Arnold (Chick) Gandil, shortstop Charles (Swede) Risberg, third baseman George (Buck) Weaver, outfielders Joe (Shoeless Joe) Jackson and Oscar (Happy) Felsch, and utility infielder Fred McMullin. It also summarizes that court records suggested payments of roughly $70,000 to $100,000 for losing, and that after admissions to a grand jury, a future commissioner ultimately banned the group from professional baseball for life.

adds further texture, describing how rumors intensified as the series progressed and how the scandal later culminated in a sweeping life ban shortly after acquittals in 1921. The same piece also underscores why the story still resonates: while many facts are known, the timing, motivations, and what was actually thrown versus what was simply bad baseball remain debated.

The core NBA question is whether incentive design can make losing “rational” to the point that it becomes corrosive to the product. Commissioner Adam Silver has openly described tanking as unacceptable behavior that, at times, became too normal in the public eye, and ’s coverage of the league’s most recent overhaul connects the reforms directly to preserving the integrity of games.

To that end, the NBA’s Board of Governors approved the “3-2-1 Lottery” framework on May 28, 2026, a format intended to flatten odds for the teams with the worst records and to reduce the reward for finishing last. In the new system, 16 teams participate and the three worst teams lose a lottery ball each, limiting them to two balls in the draw. ’s explanation also lays out the intent: discipline tools will be broader, including the ability to reduce lottery odds, modify draft positions, and impose significant fines on teams engaging in egregious conduct meant to improve odds.

The league is also publishing specific probabilities, a sign that it is trying to manage expectations rather than merely threaten punishment. ’s breakdown lists the three-worst-record teams with a 5.4% chance to win the No. 1 pick (and 16% for a top-3 result), while AP reports the worst-record group at the same 5.4% figure and places the 4th-through-10th worst group at 8.1% for the No. 1 pick.

Even with reforms, the bottom of the standings will exist, and randomness is built into the lottery for a reason. The practical difference in the NBA’s latest approach is that it tries to reduce the “profit margin” of tanking behavior, making it harder to treat draft position as a guaranteed path to elite talent. What to watch next is how teams structure late-season decision-making under the revised rules, and whether the league’s expanded disciplinary authority results in clear deterrence rather than lingering skepticism.

The Black Sox story is about corruption, not bad strategy. But it shows why sports leagues eventually have to ask the same uncomfortable question: if the system rewards losing in a way that attracts bad actors, the temptation will find a way to grow. The NBA’s new lottery mechanics are an attempt to close that door before it swings open again.