Michael Burry bets on Nvidia options as a hedge, while taking positions in Oracle, Palantir and NBIS, according to market reports

A market report says Michael Burry bought call options on Nvidia (NVDA) while also adding to positions in Oracle (ORCL) and Palantir (PLTR) and taking short exposure on NBIS. The report describes Burry’s Nvidia view as a theoretical valuation that he believes is “much lower than today’s market value,” paired with a belief that Nvidia’s market power will not translate into shareholder distributions at the scale implied by investors.

The reported Nvidia trade involves call options, contracts that give the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares at a set price within a set period. Burry’s use of calls as a hedge, as described in the report, suggests he is seeking exposure that can benefit if Nvidia’s stock moves, while his broader thesis is framed as skeptical of the stock’s valuation.

The same report characterizes Burry’s core concern as related to how Nvidia’s monopoly-like position, in his view, will be converted into shareholder value. It alleges that he expects Nvidia will not distribute enough to shareholders, even if demand for its chips remains strong, implying that buybacks, dividends, or other direct shareholder returns may not keep pace with the valuation market participants have placed on Nvidia’s dominance.

Beyond Nvidia, the report says Burry added to Oracle and Palantir. It also says he increased short exposure in NBIS. Because the underlying details of those trades are not presented in the excerpted material for this story, it is not possible to confirm the size, timing, or specific structures of the options and short positions from the information available here.

If the reported logic holds, it highlights a common split in technology market narratives: not whether a company has leading products, but whether the economics flow through to shareholders in a way that justifies the stock price. A valuation can be supported by long-run earnings power, yet challenged if capital allocation and distribution policy do not match the market’s assumptions, a distinction Burry’s comments in the report appear to emphasize.

Sector context also matters. Nvidia’s business depends heavily on the sale of high-performance AI processors and related systems into data centers, where buyers have been willing to pay for performance and platform maturity. In periods when capex cycles are robust, that can translate into strong revenue expectations. But market skepticism often turns on what happens next, including competitive dynamics, customer concentration, and how management chooses to return capital.

The report does not provide the full quantitative foundation for Burry’s “much lower” valuation estimate, nor does it specify whether his expectations about shareholder distributions refer to dividends, repurchases, or other mechanisms. It also does not disclose the contract terms for the Nvidia calls, such as strike price, expiration date, or the number of contracts. As a result, investors and readers should treat the trade description as an attribution to Burry’s reported positions rather than a complete, checkable portfolio disclosure.

Going forward, the key question is whether Nvidia’s capital allocation and shareholder-return behavior over time aligns with the report’s depiction of Burry’s thesis. Readers may also watch for updates on Nvidia’s reported AI demand trajectory and any indicates from management that clarify how it prioritizes reinvestment versus distribution, since the report’s central critique appears tied to that balance. Separately, changes in reported holdings across ORCL, PLTR, and NBIS would indicate whether Burry’s broader strategy is converging with or diverging from his stated valuation framework.